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 2 
Introduction 
 The period of inflation that occurred following the discovery of the Americas, 
with prices in Europe increasing an average of fourfold over a hundred years, is a 
substantial development that merits careful examination. A further understanding of its 
roots, causes, and effects, beyond the context of monetary research, chips away at the 
core of economic theory and the mechanisms of the human economic system during the 
sixteenth century. Moreover, examining the transition of this inflation from Europe into 
the Ottoman sphere sheds light on fundamental changes within the emerging Eurasian 
trading network.1 
 There have been many studies focused on the Price Revolution in the European 
context where it originated. Historians and philosophers have examined the causes of this 
unprecedented period of inflation as early as 1568, when French jurist and political 
philosopher Jean Bodin inquired into the linkage of prices with the quantity of the money 
supply. The most notable historians researching the topic since that time include Earl J. 
Hamilton, Michel Morineau, Fernand Braudel, P.H. Lindert, and Dennis Flynn. Among 
scholars of the Ottoman Empire, Ömer Lutfi Barkan was the first to extensively study the 
Price Revolution in the Ottoman context. His work was revised and expanded by Şevket 
Pamuk, who re-examined the price indices Barkan created. He also expanded on 
Barkan’s conclusions by referencing newer research in related areas including monetary 
history, bullion flows, and advancements in economic theory.  
 The work of Barkan and Pamuk is invaluable when analyzing inflationary effects 
within the empire. Pamuk’s book, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, is a key 
                                                        
1 Baki Tezcan, “The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited,” Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient 52, no. 3 (2009): 460-504. 
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reference for any aspect of monetary history. Utilizing Süleymaniye Imaret expenditures 
and government records, Pamuk has constructed price indices that serve as exceptional 
data sets and visual references (Figure 1). This allows a careful examination of the 
significant effects and potential causes for the standout rise in prices that occurred in the 
first half of the 16th century. The inflationary effects and price increases had a significant 
impact on many aspects of Ottoman society. Key areas will be examined below.  
 
Figure 1. Süleymaniye Imaret expenditures, 1489-1656 
 
I. Relevance of Inflation 
The Price Revolution of the sixteenth century had a widespread impact on Europe 
and its neighboring economies. Although extensively involved in international trade due 
to its superior position at a crossroads between Asia and Europe, the Ottoman Empire 
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was primarily an agrarian self-sufficient economy. The Ottoman central administration 
set out to ensure the sustenance and provision of basic commodities to its subjects in 
order to preserve its status and avoid any unrest that could potentially grow into a 
rebellion. Thus, when faced with shortages of goods, the government actively sought to 
restrict the export of the given shortage commodity. However, the central administration 
achieved minimal success in these endeavors, and external market forces that originated 
in Europe subsequently spread to the Ottoman economy.2  
The inflationary pressures of the Price Revolution had an impact on Ottoman 
agricultural organization, state finances, industry, and the growth of corruption.3 This 
analysis will examine the causes, effects, and scope of inflation in the sixteenth century. 
Inflation alone did not cause these drastic changes, as other very significant 
developments also contributed to the turbulent economic environment. However, 
inflation did, in fact, influence many basic transformations, including shifts in wealth, 
power, and the enrichment of specific social classes at the expense of others. In his 
studies on the military and fiscal reforms that took place toward the end of this period, 
Halil Inalcik noted that numerous accounts of the time indicate a widespread fear for the 
imminent collapse of the Empire.4  
 
 
                                                        
2 Ömer Lutfi Barkan, translated by Justin McCarthy, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A 
Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, 
no.1 (1975): 3-28. See also, Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l’Epoque de 
Philippe II (Paris: Références, 1993), 1:448, 488.  
3 Şevket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 128; Cemal Kafadar, “When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew and Bankers Became Robbers of 
Shadows: The Boundaries of Ottoman Economic Imagination at the End of the Sixteenth Century” (PhD 
diss., McGill University, 1986). 
4Halil Inalcik, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” Archivum 
Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 283. 
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II. Origins of the Price Revolution 
 To understand the impacts of the Price Revolution in the Ottoman context, it is 
first essential to examine its origins. The sixteenth century undoubtedly marked a new 
chapter in global economics. There is consensus among historians that the discovery of 
the New World and the inclusion of an ‘Atlantic Economy’ into the global economic 
system caused major changes in commerce and trade patterns. However, there is still 
much debate over how and to what extent this impact was experienced by various state 
economies. From the beginning of the 1500s to approximately 1650, prices in Europe 
increased an average of 100 to 200 percent.5  
In the early 1930s, Earl J. Hamilton studied the impact of the arrival of Spanish 
silver bullion from the New World, and the following specie supply shock that occurred 
throughout the 1500s.6 There was, however, study and speculation on the linkage 
between bullion inflows and inflation as early as the third quarter of the sixteenth 
century.  Jean Bodin created the line of inquiry that led to the foundation of the quantity 
theory of money and its ensuing application as an explanation for such inflationary 
effects.7  
The argument of quantity theorists is supported by the equation of exchange, 
which was theorized in the works of John Stuart Mill and David Hume, and was later 
expressed algebraically by Irving Fisher in 1911. It is given as M x V = P x T, where M 
denotes the money supply, V denotes the velocity of circulation, P denotes prices, and T, 
                                                        
5 Şevket Pamuk, “The Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 33, no. 1 (2001): 69-89. 
6 E. J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1934). 
7 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 113. Bodin is regarded as the discoverer of the 
quantity theory of money, but in his obituary note on Simon Newcomb, Irving Fisher, who developed the 
Algebraic equation, credited Newcomb as the founder of the quantity theory. See Irving Fisher, “Obituary: 
Simon Newcomb,” The Economic Journal 19 (Dec. 1909): 641-644.  
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the volume of transactions. Thus theoretically, P can increase as a result of either an 
increase in the money supply or an increase in the velocity of circulation. Both sides of 
this argument have been analyzed.8 Cracking the core of monetary theory, the classic and 
most pertinent question is: did a supply shock of bullion and specie cause inflation, or 
merely support it? Perhaps the answer is not well defined as one or the other, but is 
somewhere in between. In line with the basic concept of supply and demand, it seems 
likely that an influx of specie had, at the very least, a partially causal effect on inflation.  
It is important to note that large silver bullion shipments continued to be imported 
into Europe in the seventeenth century, when prices generally declined.9 This casts 
significant doubt on the monetarist framework. If the monetarist framework is to be 
maintained in the seventeenth century, the decline in prices would have to be explained 
by either a constant money velocity (V) coupled with a substantial increase in the number 
of transactions (T), or a decline in money velocity paired with a minor rise in T. The two 
known variable trends are M, which continued to rise, and P, which reversed direction 
and started to decline after 1600 (Figure 4). 
 Alternative explanations for the inflation include external factors such as 
population growth, which would account for the fact that food prices generally increased 
more rapidly than prices for manufactured goods.10 Studies regarding the effects of the 
                                                        
8 For a summary of arguments challenging the quantity theory, see Pamuk, “The Price Revolution in the 
Ottoman Empire Reconsidered,” 69-89. 
9 Michel Morineau proved this in his research, and demonstrated that E.J. Hamilton failed to accurately 
take into account bullion shipments to Europe in the seventeenth century by underestimating the amount of 
smuggling. Michel Morineau, Incroyables Gazettes et Fabuleux Métaux: Les Retours des Trésors 
Américains d'après les Gazettes Hollandaises (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles) (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009).  
10 H.A. Miskimin, “Silver, Not Sterling: A Comment on Mayhew's Velocity,” The Economic History 
Review 49, no. 2 (1996): 358-60.  
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Price Revolution on the Ottoman Empire have mainly focused on the rise of food prices; 
there have been few examinations on the prices of manufactured goods.  
 The rampant inflation of the sixteenth century was a stark contrast to the specie 
shortages and ‘silver famine’ of the previous century. Due to its vast territorial expanse 
and diverse geographical composition, the Ottoman Empire in the 1500s was not a single 
currency zone.11 Instead, it was comprised of various currency regions. Similar to 
Europe, silver specie was the main medium of exchange in the Ottoman Empire. Because 
of periodic debasements, and the falling value of silver, gold was a preferred unit of 
account and store of value. 12 The predominant silver currency was the akçe, and it was 
complemented by the internationally recognized gold currency of the sultânî. There were 
various monetary zones within the Ottoman Empire. These zones were a result of policy 
that maintained order in newly acquired territories and encouraged gradual integration 
into the empire, mainly to avoid additional resistance and limit forced change imposed by 
Istanbul. Integration of these zones happened more rapidly due to market forces, not 
government policy.13 However, despite the variety of currency zones, as Figure 2 
displays, the mints for the akçe and sultânî were evenly dispersed across the empire in the 
late sixteenth century. 
                                                        
11 Tezcan, “The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited,” 460-504. 
12 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 64; Halil Sahillioğlu, Studies on Ottoman Social and 
Economic History (Istanbul: Yildiz Matbaacilik, 1999), 32. 
13 Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern 
World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 14-45. 
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Figure 2. Mint locations for the akçe and sultânî, 1566-95 
 The Ottomans first struck their own currency in 1326 in the name of Orhan Bey,14 
the second Ottoman ruler. The issuance of currency was highly regarded as a symbol of 
sovereignty and influence. Whenever a new sultan came to power, one of his first orders 
of business would be the issuance of new coinage in his name. Prior to the Ottomans, the 
Ilkhanids of Mongol descent had successfully created a monetary sphere in the Near East, 
which rivaled that of the internationally dominant gold currencies of Venice (ducats) and 
Florence (florins).15 However, the initial weight of Ottoman coinage was more similar to 
the coinage of the Byzantines than that of the Mongols.16 The weight and silver content 
of the silver akçe was quite stable between 1489 and 1585, with the exception of two 
debasements enacted in 1489 and 1566 that saw the silver content decrease by 12%. In 
                                                        
14 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 30. 
15 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 21-39. 
16 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 32. Additional numismatic analysis can be found in 
Philip Grierson, Byzantine Coinage (Georgetown: Dumbarton Oaks, 1999). 
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addition to debasements, the availability and abundance of gold and silver continually 
fluctuated, which led to arbitrage, and a naturally unstable relationship between the two.17  
Debasement as a means of fiscal recovery to address deficit expenditure was not a 
new phenomenon.18 However, the debasement of 1586 was markedly unrivaled in its 
scope and scale, as the akçe lost 44% of its silver content.19 Until the end of the 
seventeenth century, bimetallism was not utilized in the minting of Ottoman coinage. 
Instead, the government mandated the striking of a given number of akçe from 100 
dirhams of clean silver. Therefore when the akçe was debased, each coin became smaller 
and lighter. Following the debasement of 1586, there was a janissary mutiny in Cairo 
related to the declining market value of their salaries. This resulted in the beheading of 
Beylerbey Mehmed Pasha and the Treasurer (Defterdar), who were two of the men most 
responsible for the debasement.20 A new akçe was standardized to restore financial 
stability in 1589, but the volatility of the currency continued and the akçe’s value 
declined steadily. 
With the exception of this large debasement in 1586, the akçe had gradually been 
losing value as shown by the rising prices in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 displays the price 
indices in terms of akçes, and Figure 4 displays prices adjusted per 1.0 gram of silver. 
The increase in terms of akçes is more substantial, indicating that the inflation was 
caused more by debasements than pure silver inflation. However, when adjusted for 
silver content, the general trend is still the same. This indicates that there was in fact 
                                                        
17 Fernand Braudel, translated by Sian Reynolds, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, vol. 1 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
18 The first Ottoman sultan to regularize debasements as a scheduled recurring policy was Mehmed II, who 
enacted a policy of ‘renewal of coinage’ (tecdid-i sikke) every ten Islamic calendar years. See Pamuk, A 
Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 47-49. 
19 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 38. 
20 Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century,” 12. 
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silver inflation within the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, and price inflation 
measured in akçes was not caused solely by debasements.   
 
 
Figure 3. Pamuk’s price index compared with Barkan’s previous index, 1469-1700 
 
 
Figure 4. Pamuk’s and Barkan’s indices adjusted per 1.0 gram of silver, 1469-1700 
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III. Agriculture and Industry 
 One of the main concerns of the Ottoman government was to sufficiently provide 
for the basic needs of its people. When faced with shortages, they implemented price 
ceilings (narhs) and restricted the export of basic commodities.21  
As European prices for agricultural goods rose rapidly, there was a prime 
opportunity for the Ottoman Empire to profit by selling agricultural goods in European 
markets. The reign of Mehmet II (r. 1444-46 and 1451-81) saw significant changes to the 
agricultural tax system, and the military. There was a substantial increase in the number 
of salaried soldiers, and subsequently, new tax collecting systems were applied to meet 
the higher expenditures of the central treasury.22 Instead of directly seizing productive 
land, the government shifted, over time, to a tax farming system (iltizam), where the 
rights to taxation were sold to the highest bidding tax farmer. Thus, the tithe revenues 
from farms that were collected in-kind went first to tax farmers who had purchased the 
tax rights. With lower prices in Ottoman lands, these collectors of agricultural products 
were enticed to elude government restrictions and sell goods to the highest bidder in 
European markets.23 As previously discussed, the higher prices for these agricultural 
goods in Europe may have been triggered by several factors. Since there was a frequent 
exchange of goods between Europe and the rest of the world, prices as a result were 
affected by the changes in various markets. Therefore, even in the absence of bullion 
flows directly from Europe, prices for goods within Ottoman territory would have 
increased. The Ottomans learned that narhs were ineffective in the long run, so they were 
                                                        
21 Narhs are included in Figures 3 and 4, represented by squares. 
22 Inalcik, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 283-297. 
23 Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century,” 27. 
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primarily implemented in major city centers during times of war or great necessity with 
priority given to Constantinople.24  
 Since the majority of the tax system was grounded in an in-kind method of 
collection, it is a fair assumption that nominal inflation would have a minimal impact on 
the revenues of the Ottoman state. However, there are numerous other factors that 
burdened the Ottoman treasury. Prolonged warfare, increased lavishness and luxury 
expenses in the palace, and expensive construction projects bloated fiscal expenditure.25 
Simultaneously, a failure to increase nominal taxes in light of inflation and an increase in 
corruption and embezzlement limited revenues and efficiency. As evidenced by treasury 
inventory records, the government underwent a financial crisis as surpluses throughout 
the beginning and middle of the sixteenth century devolved into deficits towards the 
end.26     
 
Figure 5. Ottoman central government budgets, 1523-1688 
                                                        
24 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 14-15. 
25 Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century,” 24. 
26 See Figure 5, a record of treasury revenues, expenditures, and budget deficits/surpluses compiled by 
Pamuk. 
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 The fundamental structure of the military changed with the decline of the timar 
system in favor of tax farming.27 Instead of utilizing timar-holding cavalry, who were not 
salaried as the Janissaries were, the military turned to incorporating more professional 
soldiers. This created an additional burden on government fiscal expenditure as the cost 
of the military became more streamlined and directly accounted for by the imperial 
treasury.28 
             
Figure 6. Military Expenditures across four annual budgets, 1527-1670 
 Furthermore, the effects of rising prices negatively impacted Ottoman industry 
through shortages of basic goods, and resulted in a lag in growth from the rising prices of 
commodities. Barkan describes the new form of European industry as one that “intended 
to sell the greatest possible quantity of goods abroad, while restricting imports of any 
finished products.”29 This is perhaps a cynical view of European economic intentions, but 
nevertheless the pattern of exports from the Ottoman Empire gradually began to shift 
toward a predominantly raw resource-driven export economy, while European nations 
were propelled by growth in manufacturing sectors.  
                                                        
27 Inalcik, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 283-337. 
28 See Figure 6, a table of military expenditures across four specific budget years assembled by Barkan.  
29 Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century,” 8. 
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 A prime example of a specific raw resource-driven industry is the silk trade, a key 
component of the Ottoman economy. The silk trade of Bursa flourished at the beginning 
of the sixteenth century, but witnessed a decline in the middle of the century as shortages 
occurred.30 As viewed in Figure 7, profits from the silk tax declined mid-sixteenth 
century.31  
                         
Figure 7. Silk tax revenues, 1487-1638 
Excluding the outlier of 1521, likely caused by a blockade, the general trend holds 
true. In 1518, the sale of raw silk was banned in Ottoman territory, and those caught in 
violation were forced to pay the equivalent value of the silk sold to the treasury.32 The 
complexities of the early modern world economy make it difficult to pinpoint specific 
causes and effects. However, the growing silk industry in Tours that commenced in 1470, 
and other competing sources, likely contributed to Ottoman silk difficulties as well. 
                                                        
30 Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 1:226-229.  
31 See also, Murat Çizakça, “Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial 
Decline, 1550-1650,” The Journal of Economic History 40, no. 3 (1980): 533-50. 
32 Halil Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 229. This was primarily an act of 
economic warfare against the Safavids. 
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Furthermore, Ottoman goods were not as sought-after by Europeans as Far Eastern 
goods. Braudel states, “…Turkey was merely a transit point for silver coins from Europe 
on their way East.”33  
 With the new organization of the military, and the failure of the government to 
adequately salary and occupy the troops, there was a marked rise in the number of 
soldiers who turned to commercial activities to gain additional profit.34 This created a 
system of capitalism wherein soldiers became involved in commerce and were able to 
coerce and intimidate their way to economic gain by leveraging their status and 
privileges. In Barkan’s words, “such a capitalism was in fact a hideous instrument of 
waste and corruption for the state, an organization for the systemic spoliation of the 
people.”35 Dating back to the foundation of the Ottoman state, there was tension around 
the concept of capitalism,36 and the difference between ethical business and profiteering 
was a point of contention. With these developments, it seems clear that the integrity of 
the military was degraded, and along with it, the norms of society.37 Barkan also notes 
that during this period petty bribery (bahşiş) and the selling of public office became 
commonplace.38 Such practices were amplified by the declining value of silver, as the 
fixed salaries of Janissaries fell in real terms unless they were given raises, even if 
debasements were not undertaken.  
 
                                                        
33 Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 459. 
34 Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century,” 23-25. See also Inalcik, “Military and Fiscal 
Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 290-291. This proliferated in the 17th century when 
the Janissary corps was expanded in Anatolian towns to combat the rising threat of armed rebels (levend-
sekbāns), mainly unemployed young men who were pillaging the countryside.  
35 Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century,” 24. 
36 Kafadar, “When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew and Bankers Became Robbers of Shadows.” 
37 Cemal Kafadar, “On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries,” Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 
15, no. 2 (1991): 273-280. 
38 Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century,” 26. 
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IV. Distributed Economic Effects, and Conclusions 
 The foundation of the Ottoman state was greatly weakened as corruption 
degraded the integrity and efficiency of the central administration. A general state of 
economic decline set in as prices of basic commodities increased and urban wages 
stagnated.39 The privatization of agriculture benefitted elite landholders along with the 
government that profited from tax farming; both amassed wealth at the expense of 
peasants and urban workers. Debasements as a means to deal with treasury shortages 
proved to be detrimental to the financial stability of the akçe currency and led to popular 
unrest.  
 The Celalî rebellions that occurred in this period may be viewed as a direct result 
of the deteriorating economic conditions. Population growth, rising unemployment, and 
increasing costs of basic goods all contributed to an atmosphere of desperation and 
unrest. There were some individuals who took advantage of this environment and were 
able to enlist groups of young men and students to rebel against the Ottoman 
government.40 They were suppressed with violence by the Ottoman regime, and their 
threat to the integrity of the empire was limited in scope. However, their lasting memory 
is a testament to their importance within the domestic Ottoman sphere and the rising 
levels of dissatisfaction within certain social classes. 
External inflationary pressures originating in Europe related to the inflows of 
silver bullion from the New World were transmitted through trade into the Ottoman 
economic sphere. The largest externality was perhaps a harsher climate towards the end 
of the sixteenth century, in which agricultural output saw more substantial fluctuations 
                                                        
39 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 129. 
40 Inalcik, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 285. 
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and shortages than in the previous century.41 These external inflationary pressures of the 
Price Revolution were intensified by debasements of the akçe. The debasement of 1586 
contributed significantly to monetary instability within the empire. Furthermore, inflation 
magnified and, in some cases, created crises in areas including agriculture, the military, 
industry, and the inner workings of the central government. What followed was a period 
of instability characterized by financial distress, military hardship, and the 
decentralization of sultanic authority, circumstances that rippled through the remainder of 
Ottoman history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
41 Chris Gratien, "Ottoman Environmental History: A New Area of Middle East Studies," The Arab Studies 
Journal 20, no. 1 (2012): 246-54.  
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